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新余翻譯公司關鍵字：Third, the transitional mixed-mode and the game of the third generation of class participants
Through the above analysis we believe that the government's limited rationality lead to non-embedded primary and from outside the market economy system, the construction of a lack of sufficient knowledge, and the Government of the paradox of instrumental rationality in the system but also to the sustainability of the supply side lack of motivation, while the nonlinear characteristics of the evolution of the system makes the government will deviate from the actual institutional arrangements to set the initial path, so the government can not be all of the market system on a one-time negotiations, which will result in a huge game cost [13] . Thus, a transition is considered a mixed-mode bound to the logic of this progressive generation.
System, the edge of the system and then to the idea of ??institutional change within the system is China's economic circles of the Chinese market are basically the same path of deconstruction. The first two features are incremental system construction [14], which are structural characteristics of the system changes. Whether it be outside the system reform or marginal reforms, in order to make the existence of the new system can be, we must build a relatively stable system, so that the efficiency of the new system into full play, which in the latter structural features of the reforms have yet to fully expanded circumstances, it evolved into economic circles in order to be known as the "dual track" mixed-mode transition. The basic characteristics of this mixed-mode performance, in respect that line the old structure of the system under the premise of ways by the new system to allow lawful access to benefits outside the system, that is de facto recognition of income creation and distribution of the means of two systems exist.Here we wish to avoid a "dual track" concept. Because all along, "dual system" are considered to be a transitional system of non-equilibrium structure of the system wait until the completion of stage effect, can be constructed with a strong political power of rational government to provide the use of legitimate coercive , to modify or decree of the way of a "merger", and ultimately achieve the goal of a balanced model. However, in our view, this mixed mode since it is the product of a balanced game, then it must have a balance of features, as mentioned above, once a particular system is established, it tends to self-sustaining, and only steady The balanced structure of the system, it is possible to newly provide a stable income expectations, and thus make the new system means a continuing nature, the effectiveness of the new system can be fully realized. This balanced mixed-mode transition is consistent with our previous analysis of the text of a balanced system of point-like features of the evolution of the Line. Government-led approach each new system changes are meant to break the old equilibrium point and the establishment of a new equilibrium.
From game theory, the evolution of stable strategy (ESS) is the evolution of the most widely used in game theory concepts, the basic idea is: Suppose there is a choice of a particular strategy for all groups and a large selection of mutations in small groups of different strategies, This mutation into small groups to the formation of a large group of mixed groups, small groups, if the mutation in the game in the mixed group received the payment is greater than the original group of individuals received the payment, then small groups will be able to invade a large group; other hand, not be able to invade in the evolution of large groups disappear. If a group can eliminate the intrusion of any small group of mutations, then known as the evolution of the group reached a steady state, when the group's strategy is to choose the evolution of stable strategy (Zhang Bridge, 2001). Once this evolutionary stable strategy is adopted, it will form a group in a balanced and this balance is not for another strategy that can not be verified "harassment" of. In other words, when a group adopts a strategy σ *, and this group outside of him who (mutans) The strategy σ can not intrusive members of this group σ * strategic choices, that is not in this group strategies to promote σ. If we use more precise language of game theory to strategy σ when he used when a person (group of) σ * Player uses policy or payment is defined as the expected utility EU (σ *, σ), can have the following evolutionary stable strategy Definition: only if the following two conditions hold, the strategy σ * is an evolutionary stable strategy: (1) J for all strategy, EU (σ *, σ *) ≥ EU (σ, σ *) was established; ( 2) for all strategies σ, or EU (σ *, σ *)> EU (σ, σ *), or EU (σ *, σ)> EU (σ, σ). (Wesson, 2001)
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